By Charanjit S. Jutla, Arnab Roy (auth.), Kazue Sako, Palash Sarkar (eds.)
The two-volume set LNCS 8269 and 8270 constitutes the refereed lawsuits of the nineteenth foreign convention at the idea and alertness of Cryptology and knowledge, Asiacrypt 2013, held in Bengaluru, India, in December 2013. The fifty four revised complete papers offered have been rigorously chosen from 269 submissions. they're equipped in topical sections named: zero-knowledge, algebraic cryptography, theoretical cryptography, protocols, symmetric key cryptanalysis, symmetric key cryptology: schemes and research, side-channel cryptanalysis, message authentication codes, signatures, cryptography dependent upon actual assumptions, multi-party computation, cryptographic primitives, research, cryptanalysis and passwords, leakage-resilient cryptography, two-party computation, hash functions.
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Additional info for Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2013: 19th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Bengaluru, India, December 1-5, 2013, Proceedings, Part I
Why natural approaches fail. Recall that in the bounded player model, the only assumption is that the total number of players that will ever be present in the system is a priori bounded. Then, as observed by Goyal et al , the black-box lower-bound of Canetti et al.  is applicable to the bounded player model as well. Thus, it is clear that we must resort to non-black-box techniques. Now, a natural approach to leverage the bound on the number of players is to associate with each veriﬁer Vi a public key pki and then design an FLS-style protocol  that allows the ZK simulator to extract, in a non-black-box manner, the secret key ski of the veriﬁer and then use it as a “trapdoor” for “easy” simulation.
If this the case, it sends (sid, Pi , idi ) to Pj (or A). Otherwise, it returns (sid, Pi , ⊥). N Fig. 1. The Bounded Player Functionality Fbp Constant-Round Concurrent Zero Knowledge in the Bounded Player Model 29 In our constructions we will explicitly work in the setting where the identity of each party is a tuple (h, vk), where h ← Hn is a hash function chosen from a family Hn of collision resistant hash functions, and vk is a veriﬁcation key for a signature scheme. 2 Concurrent Zero Knowledge in Bounded Player Model In this section, we formally deﬁne concurrent zero knowledge in the bounded player model.
Algorithm K1 . The CRS is generated as: D1 a1 · −1 b ⎤ ⎡ b · D1 := ⎣ 1 ⎦ · g2 −b CRSt×1 p,0 := Al (t+2)×1 CRSv,0 D2 a2 · −1 b ⎤ ⎡ b · D2 := ⎣ 0 ⎦ · g2 0 CRSt×1 p,1 := Al (t+2)×1 CRSv,1 where D1 and D2 are random matrices of order t × 1 independent of the matrix D chosen for proving the other components. The Zq element b can be re-used from the other components. def Prover. Let l = x · Al (a1 + tag · a2 ) . The prover generates the following proof for the last component: p := x · (CRSp,0 + tag · CRSp,1 ) Veriﬁer.